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ABSTRACT 
We investigate if information from checking accounts may help banks to monitor the credit 
risk of their customers. Analyzing a unique data set with more than 3 million account-month 
observations from the period 2002-2006, we find that the credit line usage, the cumulative 
number of limit violations, the account amplitude and credit payments exhibit an abnormal 
pattern approximately 12 months before default events. Differentiating by customer type 
reveals that checking account information is particularly helpful for monitoring small 
businesses and individuals. We condition the checking account behavior on customers’ 
internal credit ratings and control for credit line changes as well as bank relationship 
characteristics like the number of accounts, distance and duration. 
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Close relationships between banks and their customers can reduce the degree of asymmetric 
information in lending which may be beneficial for both. Boot (2000) summarizes the state of 
the relevant literature as follows: “… little is known about how banks obtain information, 
what type of information they acquire, and how they use this information.” The literature 
survey by Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) confirms that the previous quote still holds for 
recent years. Accordingly, there are at least three fundamental questions which have not been 
answered sufficiently yet. First, what are the sources of (credit-relevant) information in 
banking? On the one side, banks follow a standardized credit rating process to screen 
prospects and to monitor existing borrowers (see Udell (1989)). On the other side, banks have 
begun to consider data from checking accounts and payment transactions systematically to get 
a continuous flow of information. Second, what type of information do banks rely on? 
Information may be classified as private vs. public and as hard vs. soft (see Berger and Udell 
(2002), Petersen (2004), Grunert, Norden, and Weber (2005)). Financial statements and 
payment information are usually considered as hard information while examples for soft 
information are the management quality, the market position and information from social 
interactions (see Agarwal and Hauswald (2007)). Third, for which purposes do banks use 
certain information? Examples are the loan approval decision, credit pricing, credit 
monitoring, loan loss provisioning, capital requirements, and credit risk transfer. This paper 
relates to all of these questions. 
Checking accounts may represent one potentially useful source of information which can 
be complementary to the information included in internal rating systems. The advantage of 
checking account information is that it represents private, continuous, timely, almost costless 
(given an existing information technology system), and hard information. Note that these 
characteristics meet the definition of relationship lending in the sense that the information is 
proprietary and based on multiple interactions (see Boot (2000)). A further advantage is that 
checking accounts do not only reveal information about debit payments (like credit card 
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accounts) but also on credit payments which represent an important determinant of a 
borrower’s debt capacity. Moreover, unlike accounting numbers payments are not or less 
likely to be influenced by rules and policies. However, potential problems may arise due to 
dilution across accounts at the same bank and dilution across different banks. Accordingly, 
main or housebanks can benefit mostly from this source of information. 
In this paper we analyze whether information from checking accounts may help banks to 
monitor the credit risk of their customers. Early warning indications that are observed 
significantly before internal credit rating changes are of high importance for banks (see 
Nakamura (1993)). Based on this information loan officers can either take restrictive actions 
or make an attempt to help the borrower through a period of financial distress. For example, 
banks may want to stop the customer relationship, to reduce or to cancel credit lines, to 
require additional collateral or to increase the existing credit line. In this context, we 
investigate by means of event study methodology and probit regressions models if and how 
early checking account variables indicate an abnormal pattern before default events. We also 
compare the usefulness of checking account information by customer and default type. 
Furthermore, we condition on the initial and the pre-default internal credit ratings and control 
for bank relationship characteristics like the number of accounts, distance and duration. 
 Our study contributes in several ways. This is the first large-sample analysis based on a 
unique data set with more than 3 million account-month observations provided by German 
bank, covering the years 2002-2006. Moreover, we compare the value of checking account 
information for different types of customers like companies, small business, and individuals 
as well as size categories (see Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (2007) for a related study 
analyzing checking account information from a Canadian bank). To the best of our 
knowledge, we are not aware of any study that examines the value of checking account 
information for individual bank customers. In addition, Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina (2007) 
focus on credit line usage while we also consider other important variables, for example the 
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amplitude of monthly account balances as well as monthly debit and credit payments. 
Furthermore, we are able to match the checking account information with customer-specific 
variables like internal credit ratings, number of accounts, distance and duration which allows 
to control for characteristics of the bank-firm relationship. Our data is particularly interesting 
because in Germany, the prototype of a bank-based financial system and the world’s third 
largest banking sector behind the U.S. and Japan (as of year-end 2006), checking accounts are 
in the center of the bank-customer relationship, i.e. all incoming and outgoing payments are 
routed through this account. Note that credit cards do not play a significant role for the 
payments of firms and are, in contrast to the U.S., a far less important means of payment for 
individuals. Most of the corporate and individual borrowers rely on financing from universal 
banks and the prevailing financing mode of firms is relationship lending (see, for example, 
Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Elsas (2005)), as opposed to arm’s-length lending in the U.S. and 
U.K. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the related literature 
and Section II describes the data. In Section III we present the methodology and report main 
results from the empirical analysis. Section IV provides robustness tests and Section V 
concludes. 
 
I. Related literature 
 This study builds upon three strands of literature. First, we briefly review empirical 
studies which include proxy variables to measure the closeness of bank relationships. Second, 
we focus on the relatively scarce literature that investigates the role of checking accounts as a 
source of information for banks. Third, we summarize insights about the importance of 
checking account data for banks’ internal rating systems from the applied credit risk and the 
banking regulation literature. 
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The first category of studies is based on the idea that banks can gather information if the 
borrower used or is still using other, i.e. non-credit related, financial services. In other words, 
there may be an informational spillover from other financial services to the lending business. 
Examples for these other financial services are checking accounts, payment services, savings 
and money market accounts, brokerage, and underwriting activities (see Black (1975), Fama 
(1985), Vale (1993), Nakamura (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Blackwell and Winters 
(1997), Cole (1998), Chakravarty and Scott (1999), Petersen and Rajan (2002), Cole, 
Goldberg, and White (2004), Elsas (2005), Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005), 
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007)). These analyses explicitly hint at the 
specific source of a potential informational advantage of banks and include dummy variable 
in empirical models to measure its impact. However, existing studies provide mixed evidence 
on the question whether checking accounts are useful for banks to gather information. In 
addition, more recent research indicates that borrowers having checking accounts at their 
lenders exhibit a smaller distance to their bank and communicate in a more personal way with 
their bankers (see Petersen and Rajan (2002)). Moreover, firms with checking accounts at 
their lenders benefit from higher credit availability if the latter are small banks (see Cole, 
Goldberg, and White (2004)). Elsas (2005) shows that payments and informational financial 
services have a positive impact on the probability of being a housebank. Finally, Berger, 
Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) find a negative impact of checking account dummies 
on bank size, the physical distance between the bank and firm, the probability of impersonal 
communication, and a significantly positive impact on the probability of having an exclusive 
lender and on the duration of the bank relationship. As mentioned above, these studies are 
restricted in the sense that they include dummy variables that indicate the existence of 
checking accounts without explaining how banks can get an informational advantage. Our 
analysis looks inside the checking accounts to detect a link between the payment behavior of 
bank customers and their credit risk. 
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The second strand of literature goes one step further in identifying the mechanism which 
may provide banks with useful credit-relevant information. Black (1975), stating that “if the 
individual routes most of his receipts and payments through his loan account, they can serve 
as a continuing source of credit information“, and Fama (1985) have inspired Nakamura 
(1993) to propose the checking account hypothesis. The latter states that checking accounts 
may be useful for banks in monitoring small borrowers. Concurrently, Vale (1993) proposes a 
theoretical model to study the complementary role of deposits as a source of funding and 
private information in lending. Solving this model leads to two empirical implications. First, 
customers that have been depositors receive better loan terms than others. Second, exclusive 
customers are treated more favorably because they do not hide information from their banks. 
Mostly related to our work is the only direct empirical test of the checking account hypothesis 
by Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (2007) which analyzes 100 SME borrowers, hereof 50 in 
financial distress, from a Canadian bank during 1988-1992. Their sample consists annual data 
from credit files (loan specifics, ratings, dates of reviews and completion of reviews, financial 
statements, information on the exclusivity of the relationship) and monthly data (value that 
the bank assigns to receivables and inventories on the basis of information provided by the 
borrower, end-of-month balance in the borrower’s checking account as well as minimum, 
average, and maximum monthly balances). The study has the following three key results. 
First, monthly changes in accounts receivable can be retraced in checking accounts if the 
borrower has an exclusive bank relationship. Second, borrowings that exceed inventory and 
accounts receivables can predict rating downgrades and loan write downs. Third, the analyzed 
bank intensifies its monitoring as the credit quality decreases, i.e. loan reviews become 
lengthier and more frequent. The authors conclude that information from checking accounts is 
indeed useful for banks in monitoring as proposed by Nakamura (1993). A complementary 
study by Sufi (2007) takes a corporate finance perspective, analyzing credit lines by means of 
10-K SEC filings from 4,604 U.S. firms during the period 1996-2003. The main finding is 
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that firms which have access to credit lines from banks have to maintain a high cash flow 
level to be able to comply with covenants. In contrast, firms with low cash flows or covenant 
violations due to declines in cash flows face a more difficult access to credit lines. Overall, 
these results suggest that the lack of access to a credit line is a robust measure to describe 
financial constraints of firms. 
The third strand of literature investigates, from an applied risk management or regulatory 
perspective, whether checking account variables (e.g. account balances, turnover measures for 
debits and credits, days of unauthorized overdrafts) can serve as an early warning indicator, 
whether it can help to improve banks‘ internal rating systems, and how banks can estimate 
exposure at default (EAD) and credit conversion factors (see e.g. Eisfeld (1935), Apilado, 
Warner, and Dauten (1974), von Stein (1983), Hackl and Schmoll (1990), Schlüter (2005), 
Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina (2007)). Note that these studies mainly examine methodological 
issues and statistical measurement techniques while the first and second strand of literature 
focus on the economic importance of checking account information for banks. Apilado, 
Warner, and Dauten (1974) show that the possession of a checking account is an important 
indicator of the creditworthiness of individual borrowers. The work of von Stein (1983) builds 
on Eisfeld (1935) and provides first quantitative evidence that checking account data allows 
to discriminate between defaulting and non-defaulting firms already two years before default. 
Subsequently, Hackl and Schmoll (1990) are able to confirm earlier findings. Moreover, 
Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina (2007) analyze data from the Spanish Credit Register during the 
period 1984-2005 to provide evidence on corporate credit line utilization and its implications 
for exposure at default (EAD) estimations. They can show that the risk profile of the 
borrower, characteristics of the bank, and the business cycle have a significant impact on 
credit line utilization. Consistent with Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (2007) they find that 
firms which subsequently default exhibit a more intensive use of credit line than other firms. 
 
 8
II. Description of the data 
 This study is based on a unique data set with monthly observations from checking 
accounts provided by a German universal bank. The bank is among the largest 5% by total 
assets in the category of comparable banks, as defined by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The 
sample period covers five calendar years, starting from January 2002 until December 2006. 
 Initially, we start with a data set including more than 3.7 millions of account-month 
observations and apply the following selection and adjustment rules. First, we exclude all 
customers that are financial institutions, public entities (state or municipality-owned), and 
certain legal advisers (lawyers, solicitors, notaries) because we want to analyze checking 
accounts of commercial and individual borrowers. Legal professions are excluded because 
notaries typically hold a large number of special purpose transaction accounts to enable their 
clients to meet obligations from sales contracts (for example real-estate transactions). Second, 
we consider all customers borrowing from the bank during the period 2002-2006 to ensure 
that our data set is free of a survivorship bias that may arise from bank switching and default 
events.1 Third, we differentiate customers by (i) legal form (categories: GROUP = 1 for 
companies like corporations and partnerships, GROUP = 2 for small businesses and liberal 
professions, and GROUP = 3 for individuals) and (ii) size measured by the mean credit 
payments per month (categories: SIZE = 1 for large customers (>95% quantile: 12,835 EUR), 
SIZE = 2 for mid-sized customers (75% to 95% quantile: between 2,979 EUR and 12,835 
EUR), and SIZE = 3 for small customers (0% to 75% quantile: between 0 EUR and 2,979 
EUR). On the one hand, differentiating by legal form has the clear advantage that this 
classification is not based on data from checking accounts, i.e. it can be seen as exogenous 
relative to the payment behavior. On the other hand, differentiating customers by their mean 
                                                 
1 The data selection is not based on a particular point in time but the entire sample period. The sample includes 
bank customers who started borrowing before 2002 but which are no longer in the sample in subsequent years 
because they switched the bank or because they went bankrupt. Moreover, the sample also includes customers 
who have started borrowing from the bank during 2002-2006. For example, there are 58,790 (51,069) accounts 
with a time series of at least 36 (48) months. We have data on exactly 60 months for 6,235 accounts. 
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credit payments may represent a more accurate proxy for size than the legal form because 
many small firms in Germany are corporations and but there are also some large businesses 
that are no corporations. However, the size proxy may be biased if a firm has multiple bank 
relationships and most of the credit payments are not observed. As both arguments are valid, 
we differentiate by GROUP and SIZE.2 Fourth, if customers change their legal form (for 
example, an individual starts running small business or a partnership is transformed into a 
corporation), we assign the legal form that is observed in most of the months to the account 
and the customer. Finally, we do not have information about a customer’s number of bank 
relationships. We believe that this is not a problem because it creates a conservative bias in 
our study, making it more difficult to provide evidence on the usefulness of checking account 
information for credit risk monitoring. If we assume that some customers have multiple bank 
relationships and the analysis of data from one bank reveals that checking account 
information is useful, the corresponding results should be even stronger for a homogeneous 
sample including only customers with single bank relationships. Moreover, given the fact that 
most individuals and small businesses in Germany typically have only one or two checking 
accounts, the dilution effect should not be very strong. Summary statistics are reported in 
Table I. 
 
Insert Table I here 
 
 Panel A describes the structure of our final data set. As can be seen from the rightmost 
column, it includes 3,271,879 account-month observations from 86,945 accounts (67,215 
customers). For comparison, the study of Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (2007) which 
mostly relates to our paper analyzes data on 100 SME borrowers from a Canadian bank. 
                                                 
2 The variable GROUP (based on the legal form) and SIZE (based on mean credit payments) exhibit a rank 
correlation of 0.28 (p<0.0001), indicating that both criteria are significantly positively related but not perfectly 
correlated. 
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Columns 2-4 in the upper part of Panel A differentiate the composition of the sample by legal 
form. 3.79% of all account-month observations come from companies, 10.28% from small 
businesses, and 85.93% from individuals. Given this large share of individuals, it is not 
surprising that most of the customers (78%) have just one checking account while companies 
and small businesses are typically among those who have multiple accounts. Note that we will 
study the robustness of the results with respect to the number of accounts later in more detail. 
Moreover, an important feature of our data set is that we have a time series of 48-60 months 
for 77% of all checking accounts, allowing not only cross-sectional but also time-series 
analysis. 
 Panel B summarizes the main checking account and bank-relationship variables for the 
entire sample at the account level. Note that all checking account variables are reported in 
thousands of Euro. For example, the mean minimum balance per month (LOW) is -0.16 and 
the corresponding maximum (HIGH) is 4.15. Mean cumulative debits (DEBIT) and credits 
(CREDIT) run up to 8.04 and 8.22 respectively. The mean balance (MID) is 1.99 and the 
average credit line (LIMIT) amounts to -8.12. In addition, the absolute account amplitude 
AMPLI (calculated as HIGH minus LOW) describes the monthly variation at an account and 
exhibits a mean of 4.32. Furthermore, we calculate the variable USAGE (defined as MID 
divided by LIMIT, in %) to report the credit line usage. Note that the negative mean of 
USAGE (-108.47) indicates no credit line usage on average (i.e. a credit balance) while 
positive values correspond to an actual use of a credit line. The mean duration of the bank-
customer relationship DUR is 8.06 years3 and the mean distance between the domicile of a 
customers and the bank’s head office DIST is 7.21 kilometers.4 The average internal credit 
                                                 
3 Related studies report similar durations, for example 7.9 years (Degryse and Ongena (2005)) and 5.1 years 
(Ongena and Smith (2001)). 
4 The variable DIST reflects the aerial distance between the borrowers and the bank, based on the first three 
digits of the postal code. Other studies report 8 miles (Agarwal and Hauswald (2007), for relationship 
borrowers), 9 miles (Petersen and Rajan (2002)), and 4.3 kilometers (Degryse and Ongena (2005)). Our results 
are not much affected if we compute the distance between the customer and the nearest bank branch because all 
branches of the bank are relatively close to the bank’s head office which is located in a metropolitan area. 
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rating RAT is 2.87 (on a 6-grade scale, with 1 being the best grade, grades 5 and 6 included 
defaulted borrowers) and most of the customers have a rating of 2 or 3. The bank has different 
internal credit rating systems for firms and individuals and systematically considers the rating 
for all loan approval decisions, loan pricing and loan loss provisioning (see Machauer and 
Weber (1998), Treacy and Carey (2000), Grunert, Norden, and Weber (2005) for studies on 
internal credit rating systems of banks). Internal credit ratings for firms are based on hard 
facts (analysis of financial statements) and soft facts (market position, management quality, 
etc.) while ratings for individuals are based on variables like age, marital status, home status, 
income, etc. Most important, information from checking accounts is not included in the 
bank’s internal credit rating system and it is not used in any other systematic way. This fact 
rules out that borrowers strategically adjust their payment behavior to hide information from 
the bank. In addition, borrowers which are close to financial distress have the strongest 
incentives to hide information but they have typically the lowest financial flexibility to do so. 
 Panel C presents the number of different types of credit events. During the sample period, 
we observe 12,803 changes of the internal credit ratings. Although we know the exact dates, 
we assign a rating change to the corresponding month since all other variables are measured 
at a monthly frequency. Differentiating by direction of the rating change leads to 5,515 rating 
upgrades and 7,288 rating downgrades. Finally, we observe 1,009 default events, i.e. these 
customers were downgraded to grade 5 (first specific loan loss provision, 90 days past due on 
any obligation, restructuring, utilization of collateral, attachment proceedings) or grade 6 
(bankruptcy filing). This definition of default is common practice at banks and meets the 
international regulatory requirements (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006)). 
The type of default is distributed almost uniformly with 541 downgrades to rating 5 and 468 
downgrades to rating 6. Note that defaults to grade 5 are under some control of the bank 
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management5 whereas defaults to grade 6 (bankruptcy filing) can be seen as exogenous events 
which may have implications for the usefulness of checking account information. 
 
III. Empirical analysis 
A. Methodology and univariate results 
We consider two ways of measuring whether checking account information is useful for 
assessing the credit risk of bank customers. First, we apply event study methodology which 
has been extensively used to analyze anticipation and announcement effects in financial 
economics. This approach enjoys the advantage that the results can be easily visualized. In 
addition, we estimate multivariate probit regression models in calendar time to investigate 
which factors in month t influence the probability of going to default in month t+1. 
For the event study, we proceed as follows. First, we identify and mark default events in 
calendar time. Second, we transform calendar time into event time at a monthly frequency 
with an event time window of 48 months [event time = -36, -35, …, 0, 1, …, 12]. During the 
period 2002-2006 we observe 1,009 default events and assign these incidents to event time 0. 
Third, we calculate various checking account variables of customers which default at event 
time 0 for each month in the event time window. For comparison purposes, we calculate the 
same variables at the same month for all customers in our sample. The latter serve as a 
benchmark in order to identify abnormal patterns of checking account variables of defaulters. 
This approach has the clear advantage that a bank can ex ante compare each customer with an 
appropriate benchmark (average of all customers, industry-specific, size-based benchmarks). 
Note that this methodology is similar to calculating abnormal stock returns (with a stock 
index return, an average portfolio return or a market model return as a benchmark). Taking 
non-defaulting customers as a benchmark suffers from the problem that a bank can identify 
                                                 
5 Note that the loan loss provisioning follows strict regulations and the actual specific loan loss provisions made 
by the bank are checked by the auditors, tax authorities, and federal banking supervisors. 
 13
this group only from an ex post perspective, i.e. it does not help banks obtaining ex ante 
warning indications.6 Subsequently, we report results which are based on the median variables 
for defaulters and all customers for the entire sample.7 
In a first step, we examine the credit line usage and the cumulative number of credit limit 
violations. We measure credit line usage (in %) by the variable USAGE_LOW = LOW / 
LIMIT and the variable USAGE = MID / LIMIT. A credit limit violation occurs if the 
minimum balance in a month falls short of the credit limit (LOW < LIMIT). The cumulative 
number of credit limit violations CUMVIOL is defined as the sum of all monthly limit 
violations up to a particular month. Figure 1 displays the findings for the medians of these 
variables. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
It turns out from Figure 1a that the median credit line usage of defaulters is very different 
to those of non-defaulting customers. While USAGE_LOW (USAGE) of defaulters start 
above 60% (20%) 36 months prior to default, the corresponding values of non-defaulters 
amount to roughly 0% (-30%). As explained above a negative sign for credit line usage 
indicate that there is no usage at all, i.e. the account has a credit balance. If we come closer to 
the default at event time 0, the value of USAGE_LOW (USAGE) for defaulters runs up to 
almost 100% (80%), indicating a systematic increase of credit line usage. Note that most of 
the run up of USAGE_LOW occurs during the event time interval [-36, -16]. In addition, 
USAGE displays a sharp increase nine months prior to default. Most important, during the 
negative event time the credit line usage USAGE_LOW (USAGE) of all customers remains 
                                                 
6 We also calculated the corresponding checking account variables for (i) all non-defaulters and (ii) all customer 
(without those that are already in default). The results are almost identical to the reported ones since the impact 
of the defaulters on the average variables of the entire sample is very small. 
7 Differentiated results by customer type (legal form and size) are included in Section III.C. 
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relatively stable around 0% (-30%). It can be seen that there is no systematic increase or 
decrease in the benchmark. This finding is consistent with the results for Spanish firms by 
Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina (2007) who detect a major increase in credit line usage during 
the 12 months prior to default. Moreover, from Figure 1b it can be seen that the cumulative 
number of credit limit violations for defaulters differ considerably from those of all 
customers. While the latter remains relative flat, the former increases continuously from a 
median of 5 at event time -36 to a median of 20 at event time 0. Note that the slope of the 
curve for defaulters becomes considerably steeper around event time -18. This relatively 
strong result is in line with the findings on Canadian firms from Mester, Nakamura, and 
Renault (2007). Overall, we conclude that defaulters exhibit a significantly abnormal increase 
in credit line usage and in the number of limit violations before default. 
In a next step, we analyze another potentially useful checking account variable that has 
not been considered in related studies so far. In order to asses the variation of balances within 
a month, we calculate the absolute account amplitude AMPLI, defined as AMPLI = HIGH – 
LOW. This variable takes always positive values regardless of the sign of the minimum LOW 
and maximum HIGH. Our hypothesis is that customers that go bankrupt exhibit a systematic 
decrease in the absolute account amplitude. This may be the case for the following to reasons. 
First, firms as well as individuals which subsequently default are expected to face a decline in 
credit payments. In other words, firms get into financial distress mainly if sales decrease (i.e. 
credits decrease) while debits remain relatively constant. The same reasoning holds for 
individuals that become unemployed, facing no or a reduced transfer income. Second, given a 
decrease in credit payments customers become increasingly financially constrained. 
Consequently, from a certain level debits have to decrease as well in order avoid overdrafts, 
encumbrance etc. Figure 2 depicts the event study results for the median of AMPLI. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
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Interestingly, the median amplitude AMPLI of defaulters and all customers are relatively 
similar and in a range of 1,000 to 2,000 EUR during the event time interval -36 to -6. The fact 
that AMPLI for defaulters is above the other curve during event time -36 to -30 is due to a 
relatively small number of observations in the first months.8 More important, from event time 
-5, we observe that the AMPLI of defaulters drops considerably from 1,000 EUR to less than 
200 EUR while the corresponding value for all customers does not change at all. Based on 
these results, we conclude that the account amplitude provides a warning indication roughly 5 
months prior to default. 
 In addition, we examine not only account balances but also turnover information reflected 
by the cumulative monthly credit and debit payments (CREDIT, DEBIT). We divide CREDIT 
and DEBIT respectively by the credit line LIMIT to evaluate the relative evolution of 
payments at defaulters to those at all customers.9 Note that no other study has analyzed 
payment variables like CLR and DLR before. Results for the medians of both variables are 
presented in Figure 3. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
Figure 3 indicates that both debits and credits (relative to the credit line) of defaulters are 
more or less stable in the range 60% to 80% during event time -36 to -18 and they drop 
sharply afterwards. Most of this sudden decrease occurs during event time -18 to -12. 
Obviously, cumulative credits and debits are highly correlated and move relatively in tandem 
as hypothesized above. For comparison, CLR and DLR of all customers do not change very 
                                                 
8 The graph for defaulters is based on 310 (574) observations at event time -36 (-24) and on average, during the 
entire event time window on 771 observations. 
9 The inverse of CLR and DLR can be interpreted as limit-credit duration (how many months does it take that 
cumulative credit payments can pay back the limit?) and limit-debit duration (how many months does it take that 
cumulative debit payments reach the limit?). 
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much, remaining above 70% all the time. Given these findings, we conclude that the 
evolution of credit payments indicates an abnormal pattern roughly 12-18 months prior to the 
actual default event. 
 
B. Multivariate regression analysis 
We now turn to a multivariate econometric analysis by means of probit regression models. 
All regression models are estimated in calendar time in order to take an ex ante perspective. 
Subsequently, we study which factors at calendar time t and t-12 influence the probability of 
default in calendar time t+1. Default is indicated by a dummy variable which takes a value of 
one if the customer exhibits a jump to the default grades (rating 5 or 6) in t+1. Explanatory 
variables are the change of the internal rating (ΔRAT), the credit line usage (ΔUSAGE), the 
absolute checking account amplitude (ΔAMPLI), the credit-to-limit ratio (ΔCLR) and the 
cumulative number of limit violations (ΔCUMVIOL) during the period [t, t-12] and the period 
[t-12, t-24].10 Moreover, we also include the percentage change of the credit line (ΔLIMIT) as 
a control variable. This is important because the checking account variables (except AMPLI) 
are based on the payment behavior and the credit limit. However, the bank can change the 
credit limit to manage the loan exposure. For example, USAGE may increase if (i) the 
account balance steadily declines while LIMIT remains unchanged (i.e. the bank does not 
manage the loan exposure) or (ii) the account balance remains stable while LIMIT has been 
reduced by the bank. We expect a negative sign for the coefficient of limit changes because 
limit reductions can be one response of the bank with regard to borrowers facing financial 
problems. All variable changes are calculated over twelve months because within this period 
                                                 
10 The number of observations decreases due to the model specification. We cannot include accounts with (i) a 
history of less than 13 or less than 25 months respectively and (ii) with no credit line. In Section IV.B we 
estimate an alternative model that is based on considerably more observations. 
 17
at least one internal rating review has to be carried out.11 Note that the internal credit rating 
can be seen as a benchmark against which we test the usefulness of checking account 
information.12 Results are reported in Table II. 
 
Insert Table II here 
 
 The key finding is that internal credit ratings and checking account variables have a 
statistically significant impact on the probability of default. Panel A shows that all variables 
are correctly signed and highly significant. As expected the change of the internal rating13, the 
credit line usage and the cumulative number of limit violations display a positive coefficient 
and the change of the absolute amplitude and the credit-to-limit ratio a negative coefficient. 
As expected, the control variable ΔLIMIT is statistically significant and negative. Panel B 
additionally includes the change of the explanatory variables lagged by 12 months, i.e. the 
change during the period [t-12, t-24]. Except the coefficient of ΔAMPLI and ΔCLR the results 
of Panel A are confirmed. In addition, we see that even the coefficients of the lagged rating 
change, the credit line usage and the cumulative number of limit violations are significantly 
positive. 
In summary, estimation results from probit regression models confirm univariate results 
from the event study. In addition, the multivariate analysis shows that checking account 
                                                 
11 This approach is conservative because we do not consider short-run variable changes which are more likely to 
occur at the checking accounts than in case of the internal ratings. Nonetheless, we have also estimated the 
model with changes of all variables over consecutive 3 and 6-months intervals and obtain very similar results. 
12 We have also estimated a two-stage model to test whether there is an overlap of information in credit ratings 
and checking accounts (first stage: credit rating changes as a function of checking account variables, second 
stage: future defaults as a function of the residuals from the first stage). Although checking account information 
is not formally included in the ratings, it may be possible that some loan officers make informal (or 
discretionary) use of this information. We find that the residuals from the first stage, i.e. the unexplained part of 
rating changes, are significantly positively associated with future defaults, indicating that checking account 
information goes beyond information included in credit ratings. 
13 Note that positive rating changes indicate a credit quality deterioration (for example, from rating grade 2 at 
time t-12 to rating grade 4 at time t) since higher numbers correspond to rating grades of a higher default risk. 
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information is also useful if we control for changes of internal ratings and credit lines 
changes. 
 
C. Results by customer type 
In this section we continue the analysis by questioning whether our previous results hold 
for different types of customers as well. As discussed beforehand we differentiate between 
both the legal form GROUP (companies, small businesses, and individuals) and SIZE (large, 
mid, and small). The complexity of payments at the checking accounts and the mechanism of 
default differ considerably across these groups. Note that in the following event study we use 
GROUP- or SIZE-specific benchmarks in this section. For example, a checking account 
variable of defaulters in SIZE = 1 (or GROUP = 1) is compared with the median of all 
customers from the same category, i.e. with SIZE = 1 (GROUP 1). This analysis is not only 
interesting for comparison purposes across groups but it is also more precise than the analysis 
from the previous section because the benchmarks are more appropriate. Figure 4 displays the 
event study results for the absolute checking account amplitude AMPLI which can be 
interpreted as an indicator for balance variation within a month.14 
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
Essentially, findings from the previous section are confirmed. In all sub-groups we find 
that the absolute amplitude of defaulters decreases considerably some time before default 
while the one of all customers does not change very much. However, there are important 
differences within the categories of GROUP and SIZE. Differentiating by legal forms based 
on GROUP (Figures 4a, b, c) reveals that the warning sign by AMPLI occurs 12 to 6 months 
                                                 
14 We have repeated the univariate analysis with the variables USAGE, CLR and DLR and obtain qualitatively 
similar results. 
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before default at small businesses, 6 months before default at individuals and only slightly 
before default at companies. A differentiation by SIZE (Figures 4d, e, f) leads to very similar 
results. However, for small customers (essentially individuals) a clear warning indication is 
observed 12 months prior to default. In addition, it turns out that there are no clear warning 
indications for companies and large customers. In summary, we conclude that checking 
account information from small businesses and individuals (mid-sized and small customers) 
provide banks with warning signs about the credit quality 6-12 months prior to a subsequent 
default. In contrast, checking account information does not significantly help monitoring 
companies (corporations, partnerships) and large customers (with mean monthly cumulative 
credit payments above 12,835 EUR). 
In a next step, we re-estimate the probit regression model from the previous section for the 
categories of GROUP and SIZE. Table III summarizes the estimation results. 
 
Insert Table III here 
 
 Table III provides very interesting insights on the usefulness of checking information 
across types of customers. Panel A presents the results differentiated by GROUP. The change 
of the internal credit rating, the credit line usage and the cumulative number of violations 
display a significantly positive coefficient for companies. For small businesses, only 
ΔCUMVIOL at t and t-12 and the internal credit rating change at t-12 have a significantly 
positive influence on the probability of default. Most important, for individuals we find that 
all contemporaneous checking account variables are correctly signed and highly significant. 
In addition, in contrast to commercial customers there is no impact of the internal rating 
change at t-12. Panel B distinguishes by size categories. Basically, the results shown in Panel 
B are even clearer than in Panel A. Note that the findings for large and mid-sized customers 
are very similar, i.e. the rating change in t and t-12 and the change of the cumulative number 
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of violations display significant coefficients (and ΔUSAGE at t for mid-sized customers). In 
opposite, internal credit rating changes have no impact on the probability of default for small 
customers while all checking account variables are signed as expected and highly significant. 
It is noteworthy that the change of the cumulative number of limit violations (ΔCUMVIOL) 
performs especially well. The contemporaneous change of this variable exhibits a 
significantly positive coefficient for all GROUP- and SIZE-categories and the lag is 
significant for small businesses, individuals and small customers. Finally, as expected the 
contemporaneous change of ΔLIMIT is significantly negative in for all categories. Our results 
on the checking account variables do not change if we exclude ΔLIMIT from the regression 
models. 
 
D. Results conditional on internal credit ratings 
Subsequently, we investigate whether the usefulness of checking account information 
depends on (i) the credit rating in the default status, i.e. the type of default event, (ii) the 
rating at the beginning of the checking account time series, and (iii) the rating one month 
prior to default. Our expectation is that checking account information is more useful for (i) 
defaults to rating grade 6 (bankruptcy filing) in comparison to defaults to rating grade 5, (ii) 
the better the rating at the beginning, and (iii) the better the rating before default.  
We start the analysis with a differentiation by default event types. As mentioned above 
default to rating grade 5 is under some control of the bank management while a default to 
rating grade 6 can be regarded as exogenous and has more severe consequences for the bank. 
Figure 5 shows event study results for the credit line usage behavior (USAGE) if we 
differentiate the 1,009 default events by default type (541 defaults to rating grade 5 and 468 
defaults to rating grade 6). 
 
Insert Figure 5 here 
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 During the event time -36 to -12 months the credit line usage USAGE increases in a very 
similar way that significantly differs from that of all customers. It is noteworthy that the credit 
line usage of customers with subsequent defaults to rating grade 6 is above the other curve 
most of the time. Interestingly, it increases sharply from 50% to almost 100% during the 9 
months prior to default while the corresponding variable for defaults to rating grade 5 even 
decreases during the event time interval -4 to 0. In summary, we find that credit line usage 
provides a particularly reliable short-term early warning indication of “hard defaults” while 
the usefulness for “soft defaults” is smaller. 
 In a next step, we condition the evolution of checking account variables (USAGE, 
AMPLI) on credit ratings at the beginning of a customer’s checking account time series in our 
sample and on the credit rating level one month before default. The corresponding findings 
are presented in Figure 6. 
 
Insert Figure 6 here 
 
Figures 6a and 6b reveal that checking account information is more useful for credit risk 
assessment purposes if the customer’s start rating is 1, 2 or 3. In contrast, USAGE is not and 
AMPLI is only weakly informative if customers have a start rating of 4. These results can be 
interpreted as follows. If a customer exhibits a relatively low creditworthiness long time 
before default (rating grade 4), the checking account has already reached an abnormal pattern. 
In contrast, if a defaulter’s rating is relatively good at the beginning of the sample there is 
much time left for a gradual deterioration at the checking account. The latter is exactly what 
we observe for customers with start ratings of 1, 2 or 3.  
In addition, we also condition our analysis on the rating one month before default to 
distinguish between “surprising” defaults and “unsurprising” defaults. The corresponding 
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empirical results are shown in Figures 6c and 6d. The variable USAGE is very informative for 
defaulters from relatively good ratings (1, 2, or 3) while it is not useful for rating grade 4 at 
all. The same holds for the absolute amplitude AMPLI. The amplitude for customers that 
default from good rating grades declines considerably below that of all customers 5 months 
prior default whereas the one of defaulters from grade 4 is similar to that of all customers 
during -12 to 0. Finally, these findings are confirmed by multivariate probit regression models 
(not reported here), including credit lines changes as a control variable. 
 
E. Checking account information and bank relationship characteristics 
Previous analyses have provided evidence in favor of the hypothesis that checking 
account information can help banks to monitor their customers. In this section, we examine 
whether this finding holds if we control for bank relationship characteristics. The latter are 
proxied by means of two frequently used variables from the empirical banking literature (see 
Berger and Udell 1995, Petersen and Rajan 2002, Degryse and Ongena 2005): the duration of 
the bank-customer relationship and the physical distance between the domicile of the 
customer and the bank’s head office. Both variables may be interpreted as indicators of the 
intensity of the bank-customer relationship. This implies that they also may serve as proxies 
for the degree of asymmetric information between a bank and its customers (see Boot 2000, 
Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004). Table IV presents the probit regressions results by duration 
(long, short) and distance (low, high). Again, we include credit limit changes and legal form 
(GROUP) of the customer as control variables. 
 
Insert Table IV here 
 
 With regard to duration (Panel A), we find that checking account information is more 
useful than ratings in the case of customers with a long duration. Note that changes of the 
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internal credit ratings at t and t-12 are not significantly related to future defaults at all. This 
finding suggests that the reliabilty of information from checking account becomes higher in 
the course of a bank-customer relationship. In contrast, checking account and rating 
information appear to be complementary for monitoring customers with a short duration. In 
other words: credit ratings are relatively more important for rather new customers. Panel B 
reveals that ratings and checking account information are both significantly related to defaults 
of near customers while contemporaneous checking account information is clearly less 
important in terms of statistical significance for customers located far away. Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that the variable ΔCUMVIOL performs especially well in most of the cases. 
Summarizing, we find that checking account information is more informative for 
customers with a long duration and a small distance. These results indicate that checking 
account information is particularly useful if there is a close bank-customer relationship, i.e. 
relatively low informational asymmetries. This is consistent with findings from the cross-
sectional study by Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) and implies that main banks that are 
typically relationship lenders can benefit more from extracting checking account information 
than arm’s-length banks. 
 
IV. Tests of robustness 
A. Miscellaneous empirical checks 
 In this section, we use an alternative benchmark for checking account information, 
examine the influence of outliers and analyze the stability of our findings over time. First, 
instead of including rating changes over the period [t, t-12] to predict defaults at time t+1, we 
include changes of the probability of default associated with each rating grade. This test takes 
explicitly into account that a move from grade 1 to 2 corresponds to a considerably smaller 
change in the probability of default than a move from grade 3 to 4. In other words, we control 
for the fact the difference between average PDs of adjacent rating grades is increasing the 
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lower the credit quality. It turns out that the coefficient of ΔPDt is positive and highly 
significant (p<0.01). Furthermore, the sign and the statistical significance of all checking 
account variables are not changed in comparison to Table II. Consequently, we conclude that 
previous findings are robust if we control for non-linearities in default risk changes. 
Second, we winsorize the variables USAGE, AMPLI, CLR, and LIMIT at the 
0.5%/99.5%-level to study whether extreme observations influence previous results (see, for 
example, Carey and Hrycay (2001) for winsorization of accounting variables in a default 
prediction model). Repeating all previous analyses with winsorized explanatory variables 
leads to slightly higher coefficients and essentially similar findings. The impact of credit line 
usage (USAGE) is reduced in terms of statistical significance while results for the other 
checking account variables remain basically unchanged. 
 Third, we re-estimate the probit model from Table II, Panel A, for the years 2002-2004 
(378 defaults) and the years 2005-2006 (631 defaults) separately. It turns out that rating 
changes have an impact on future defaults in both subsamples. In addition, we find that two 
out of four checking account variables (AM, CUMVIOL) are significant and correctly signed 
in the first half of the sample while all four variables are highly significant during the second 
half. Given that our data covers only five calendar years we cannot say whether this result is 
due to an increasing reliability of checking account information or simply due to the higher 
number of defaults in the second half. Most important, we observe that at least some checking 
account variables are significantly related to subsequent defaults in both sub-samples. 
 
B. Checking accounts with and without credit lines 
All findings presented so far are based on data from checking accounts with a credit line 
(55% of all account-month observations and 49% of all customers). We now investigate 
whether checking account information is also useful to assess the credit risk of customers 
which do not have a credit line. In other words, we test if our results are driven by a selection 
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bias. For this purpose, we modify the probit model from Table II, Panel A, as follows. We 
consider DEFt+1 as dependent variable and include a reduced number of explanatory 
variables: the rating change, the change of the account amplitude, and a new variable, the 
cumulative number of overdrafts (CUMOVER). The latter counts the number of limit 
violations (for customers which have a credit line) and unauthorized overdrafts (which occurs 
if LOW < 0 Euro in case of customers which have no credit line). We exclude all variables 
that can only be observed for customers with a credit line (USAGE, CLR, LIMIT). The 
number of observations available for model estimation now increases by 72% (from 1.2 
millions to 2.2 millions). First, we estimate the previously described model on all 
observations. Second, we consider only data from accounts without a credit line. Table V 
summarizes the results. 
 
Insert Table V here 
 
 The regression reveals that both the change of the internal rating (ΔRAT) and the 
cumulative number of overdrafts (ΔCUMOVER) are highly significant and positively related 
to future defaults while the account amplitude is not. In addition, differentiating by GROUP 
(not reported in Table V) indicates that ΔCUMOVER is significant for each group and the 
magnitude of the coefficient increases from companies (0.063) and small businesses (0.071) 
to individuals (0.085). Furthermore, in case of accounts without credit lines we observe that 
the cumulative number of overdrafts is the only variable that has a significant and 
economically meaningful impact on the probability of subsequent defaults. In summary, we 
can show that our previous findings do not suffer from data selection problems because 
checking account information also helps predicting defaults of customers without credit lines. 
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C. Single-account and multiple-account bank relationships 
Another important factor that might influence the usefulness of checking account 
information for loan monitoring is the structure of the bank relationship. In particular, the 
number of accounts per customer and the relative importance of each account in case of 
multiple-account bank relationships could have an impact (for example, a dilution or 
distortion of information). As shown in Table I, Panel A, the data set includes customers 
which have a single account with the bank (78% of all observations) and others which have 
multiple accounts. Subsequently, we re-estimate the baseline model at the customer level (i.e. 
one account from every customer) to study the robustness of previous findings which are 
based on an estimation at the account-level. Specifically, we consider the structure of the bank 
relationship in two ways. First, we repeat the analysis for customers which have only one 
account with the bank (i.e. there is no dilution across accounts) and compare the outcome 
with previous results. Note that this approach is rather restrictive since we drop approximately 
40% of all observations in the regression models.15 Therefore, we consider a second approach 
which ensures that we have at least one account time series from each customer. For this 
purpose, we rank all accounts per customer according to their relative importance. The latter 
is proxied by the monthly mean cumulative credit payments (debit payments) and by the 
length of the available account time series.16 Based on these rankings, we re-estimate the 
probit models on data for single-account bank relationships and the most important accounts 
in case of multiple account relationships. Following this approach we only loose 10% of all 
observations. Table VI reports the results. 
 
                                                 
15 However, the sample composition is not substantially changed. The share of account-month observations from 
companies and small businesses decreases slightly from 14.1% to 11.6%. The corresponding share at the 
customer level declines from 11.3% to 10.2%. Hence, shrinking the sample does not create selection problems. 
16 The account rank per customer based on monthly mean credits is highly correlated with the rank based on 
monthly mean debits (Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 0.95). Therefore, we only consider the mean 
credit rank in the remainder. Interestingly, the length of the account time-series exhibits a rank correlation of 
0.77 with the mean credit rank measure, indicating that both ranking approaches are not perfectly congruent. 
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Insert Table VI here 
 
 Panel A shows that the results for the checking account variables in case of single-account 
relationships are similar to Table II. This is consistent because the majority of all observations 
come from customers that have only one account and these are typically small customers like 
individuals. We also observe that internal rating changes are not significantly related to 
subsequent defaults which is in line with Table III, Panel B (small customers). In addition, for 
multiple-account bank relationships we find that the rating is relatively more important but 
still three out of four checking account variables display the expected sign and are statistically 
significant. Panel B also confirms previous results. Regardless whether we proxy the 
importance of an account by monthly mean credit payments or the length of the time series 
we obtain results very similar to Table II, Panel A. Hence, previous findings remain robust if 
we explicitly take into account the structure of the bank relationship. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Checking accounts and payment services may represent a powerful source for banks to 
extract private information about their customers. By means of a unique data set with more 
than 3 million account-month observations from the period 2002-2006 we analyze empirically 
whether checking account information may help banks to monitor the credit risk of their 
customers. 
Essentially, we find that the credit line usage, the cumulative number of limit violations, 
the account amplitude and the credit-to-limit ratio exhibit an abnormal pattern approximately 
12 months before default. Comparing customer types and size categories reveals that 
checking account information is particularly helpful for monitoring relatively small 
customers, i.e. small businesses and individuals. Especially, the change of the credit line 
usage and the cumulative number of limit violations exhibit a significantly positive impact on 
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the probability of default in the next period. Moreover, we condition the checking account 
behavior on internal credit ratings and find that checking account information conveys more 
reliable warning signs if the start and pre-default rating is relatively good in comparison to 
customers with a relatively bad rating. Distinguishing by default types (first specific loan loss 
provision vs. bankruptcy) reveals that warning indications from checking accounts are 
considerably clearer for customers who experience a more severe default event. Furthermore, 
we examine if the informativeness of checking accounts is associated with bank relationship 
characteristics like duration and distance. Interestingly, it turns out that abnormal patterns of 
checking account variables are earlier observable in case of strong bank-customer 
relationships (long duration, small distance), suggesting that this information is especially 
valuable for main banks. All results remain robust if we control for credit line changes. 
Finally, tests of robustness indicate that our findings also hold for customers with and without 
credit lines as well as for single-account and multiple-account bank relationships. 
This study has important implications. Our results reveal that checking accounts represent 
indeed a major source of information for banks that is complementary to internal credit rating 
systems. It is very unlikely that those borrowers who are close to financial distress can hide 
credit-relevant information from the bank (by manipulating their payment behavior) because 
they face considerable transaction costs and constraints. Consequently, banks can benefit 
from exploiting this private, timely, hard, and almost costless information on existing 
customers for credit risk management and pricing purposes. Avenues for further research are 
to measure the forecasting accuracy of checking account information in comparison to 
internal credit ratings as well as to study how banks react upon early warning indications. 
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Table I 
Summary statistics 
Panel A: Number of customers, accounts and account-month observations 
The data was provided by a German universal bank and the sample period is January 2002 to December 2006. 
 
Subject Companies Small businesses Individuals All 
Customers 1,969 5,644 59,673 67,215 
Accounts 3,003 8,005 75,887 86,945 
Account-months 
(%) 
123,939 
3.79 
336,286 
10.28 
2,811,654 
85.93 
3,271,879 
100.00 
Accounts per customer 
(%) 
(1) 
78.07 
(2) 
17.03 
(3-4) 
4.48 
(5 or more) 
0.42 
Length of time series in months 
(%) 
(1-11) 
1.26 
(12-35) 
12.73 
(36-47) 
8.83 
(48-60) 
77.18 
 
Panel B: Checking account and bank-relationship variables 
The variables LOW, …, and AMPLI are reported in thousands of Euros and refer to the account level. LOW and 
HIGH may be negative or positive. DEBIT and CREDIT are defined as positive numbers. MID can be positive 
or negative while LIMIT is defined as a negative number. AMPLI is a positive number. USAGE is positive if a 
credit line is drawn and negative in case of no usage. The internal rating RAT ranges from 1 (best) to 6 (worst). 
 
Variable  Variable description Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
LOW Minimum account balance per 
month 
-0.16 0.00 61.36 -6,486.24 8,959.00 
HIGH Maximum account balance per 
month 
4.15 1.00 98.68 -6,486.24 70,154.38 
MID Monthly average account 
balance 
1.99 0.50 73.08 -6,486,24 35,082.48 
DEBIT Monthly cumulative debit 
payments 
8.04 1.00 215.58 0.00 49,516.00 
CREDIT Monthly cumulative credit 
payments 
8.22 1.00 220.08 0.00 70,959.91 
LIMIT Credit limit (nominal credit 
line) 
-8.12 -2.50 80.48 -7,158.08 0.00 
USAGE Monthly credit line usage = 
BALANCE / LIMIT (%) 
-108.47 -23.35 1,986.29 -401,980.00 1,020,000.00 
AMPLI Monthly absolute account 
amplitude = HIGH - LOW 
4.32 1.00 75.13 0.00 70,143.78 
DUR Duration of bank-customer 
relationship (years) 
8.06 4.99 7.79 0.00 26.93 
DIST Distance between customer and 
bank based on first three digits 
of the postal code (kilometers) 
7.21 0.00 28.84 0.00 613.89 
RAT Internal credit rating, ranging 
from 1 (best) to 6 (worst) 
2.87 3.00 0.81 1.00 6.00 
 
Panel C: Number of credit events 
Default events are defined as internal rating changes to grade 5 or 6. The bank assigns a borrower to grade 5 
when it establishes the first specific loan loss provision. A rating 6 indicates that the customer has filed for 
bankruptcy. All events refer to the account level. 
 
Variable Number of events 
Rating changes 12,803 
   hereof upgrades 5,515 
   hereof downgrades 7,288 
Defaults 1,009 
… hereof rating 5 541 
… hereof rating 6 468 
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Table II 
Baseline probit regression results 
The dependent variable is default at calendar time t+1 (DEFt+1 takes the value 1 for jumps to default and 0 for 
non-defaults). Explanatory variables are the rating change (ΔRAT), the change of the credit line usage 
(ΔUSAGE), the change of the absolute checking account amplitude (ΔAMPLI), the change of the credit-to-limit 
ratio (ΔCLR ), the change of the cumulative number of limit violations (ΔCUMVIOL) and the relative change of 
the credit limit (ΔLIMIT) during the period [t, t-12] and the period [t-12, t-24]. We divide the variables 
ΔUSAGE and ΔCLR by 100 to scale the estimated coefficients. Regressions take into account the clustering of 
observations at the account level and are based on p-values from Huber-White robust standard errors. 
 
Panel A: Estimation results for the period one year before default 
 
Dep. Var.: DEFt+1 Coeff.  p-val. 
ΔRATt 0.130507 *** 0.000 
ΔUSAGEt 0.000142 * 0.071 
ΔAMPLIt -0.000132 *** 0.002 
ΔCLRt -0.000107 *** 0.001 
ΔCUMVIOLt 0.075857 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt -0.087240 *** 0.000 
Const. -3.646872 *** 0.000 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.067   
Obs. 1,281,227   
 
Panel B: Estimation results for the period two years before default 
 
Dep. Var.: DEFt+1 Coeff.  p-val. 
ΔRATt 0.126352 *** 0.001 
ΔUSAGEt 0.000403 *** 0.000 
ΔAMPLIt -0.000150 ** 0.036 
ΔCLRt -0.000147 *** 0.007 
ΔCUMVIOLt 0.053731 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt -0.133008 *** 0.000 
ΔRATt-12 0.151072 *** 0.003 
ΔUSAGEt-12 0.000327 ** 0.013 
ΔAMPLIt-12 -0.000112  0.278 
ΔCLRt-12 -0.000048  0.176 
ΔCUMVIOL t-12 0.033801 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt-12 -0.013785  0.148 
Const. -3.643053 *** 0.000 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.077   
Obs. 815,480   
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Table III 
Probit regression results by legal form and size 
The dependent variable is default at calendar time t+1 (DEFt+1 takes the value 1 for jumps to default and 0 for 
non-defaults). Explanatory variables are the rating change (ΔRAT), the change of the credit line usage 
(ΔUSAGE), the change of the absolute checking account amplitude (ΔAMPLI), the change of the credit-to-limit 
ratio (ΔCLR), the change of the cumulative number of limit violations (ΔCUMVIOL) and the relative change of 
the credit limit (ΔLIMIT) during the period [t, t-12] and the period [t-12, t-24]. We divide the variables 
ΔUSAGE and ΔCLR by 100 to scale the estimated coefficients. The variables GROUP is based on the 
customer’s legal form (companies, small businesses, and individuals) and SIZE is based on the average credit 
payments in a month (<75%: small, 75%-95%: mid, >95%: large). Regressions take into account the clustering 
of observations at the account level and are based on p-values from Huber-White robust standard errors. 
 
Panel A: Estimation results by legal form (GROUP) 
 Companies  Small businesses  Individuals 
Dep. Var.: DEFt+1 Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
ΔRATt 0.184604 *** 0.008  0.039642  0.518  0.085223 * 0.061 
ΔUSAGEt 0.000629 ** 0.039  0.000244  0.332  0.000441 *** 0.002 
ΔAMPLIt -0.000038  0.577  0.000056  0.646  -0.000806 *** 0.001 
ΔCLRt 0.000029  0.783  -0.000630  0.615  -0.000162 *** 0.004 
ΔCUMVIOLt 0.061574 *** 0.000  0.016049 *** 0.001  0.049243 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt -0.278374 *** 0.000  -0.173408 *** 0.000  -0.124858 *** 0.000 
ΔRATt-12 0.161231 ** 0.012  0.165212 ** 0.019  0.094969  0.283 
ΔUSAGEt-12 0.000626 ** 0.026  0.000134  0.608  0.000216  0.460 
ΔAMPLIt-12 -0.000028  0.818  -0.000056  0.697  -0.000254  0.144 
ΔCLRt-12 0.000493 ** 0.036  -0.000216  0.703  -0.000065 ** 0.021 
ΔCUMVIOLt-12 0.005214  0.730  0.027174 * 0.084  0.037399 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt-12 -0.073272  0.276  -0.007390  0.742  -0.017373  0.199 
Const. -3.247895 *** 0.000  -3.59107 *** 0.000  -3.679721 *** 0.000 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.046    0.054    0.054   
Obs. 28,494    85,003    701,983   
 
Panel B: Estimation results by customer size (SIZE) 
 Large  Mid-sized  Small 
Dep. Var.: DEFt+1 Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
ΔRATt 0.206479 *** 0.000  0.167764 ** 0.048  0.035972  0.466 
ΔUSAGEt -0.001143  0.299  0.000551 ** 0.019  0.000878 *** 0.001 
ΔAMPLIt -0.000046  0.562  -0.000463  0.684  -0.011669 *** 0.000 
ΔCLRt -0.000077  0.968  -0.000151  0.844  -0.001778 *** 0.002 
ΔCUMVIOLt 0.050922 *** 0.002  0.075786 *** 0.000  0.046392 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt -0.208655 *** 0.000  -0.110942 *** 0.000  -0.133217 *** 0.000 
ΔRATt-12 0.237709 *** 0.000  0.212156 *** 0.008  0.023042  0.818 
ΔUSAGEt-12 -0.000428  0.563  0.000416  0.121  0.001706 ** 0.015 
ΔAMPLIt-12 -0.000054  0.683  -0.000099  0.912  -0.004621 *** 0.000 
ΔCLRt-12 0.000027  0.890  0.000264  0.673  0.000577  0.392 
ΔCUMVIOLt-12 0.023682  0.106  0.009469  0.545  0.041089 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt-12 -0.062538  0.123  0.003573  0.791  -0.019517  0.200 
Const. -3.494538 *** 0.000  -3.691999 *** 0.000  -3.646014 *** 0.000 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.072    0.067    0.060   
Obs. 61,066    252,255    502,159   
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Table IV 
Probit regression results by duration and distance 
The dependent variable is default at calendar time t+1 (DEFt+1 takes the value 1 for jumps to default and 0 for 
non-defaults). Explanatory variables are the rating change (ΔRAT), the change of the credit line usage 
(ΔUSAGE), the change of the absolute checking account amplitude (ΔAMPLI), the change of the credit-to-limit 
ratio (ΔCLR), the change of the cumulative number of limit violations (ΔCUMVIOL), the relative change of the 
credit limit (ΔLIMIT) during the period [t, t-12] and the period [t-12, t-24], and GROUP2 (GROUP3) indicating 
small businesses (individuals). We divide the variables ΔUSAGE and ΔCLR by 100 to scale the estimated 
coefficients. Duration DUR is differentiated with a median split (short if DUR < 7.9 years) and distance DIST is 
differentiated by the 90% quantile (near if DIST < 12.8 kilometers). Regressions take into account the clustering 
of observations at the account level and are based on p-values from Huber-White robust standard errors. 
 
Panel A: Estimation results by duration of the bank relationship (DUR) 
 Long duration  Short duration 
Dep. Var.: DEFt+1 Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
ΔRATt 0.038433  0.503  0.124935 *** 0.003 
ΔUSAGEt 0.000433 *** 0.002  0.001328 ** 0.014 
ΔAMPLIt -0.000064  0.425  -0.000005  0.903 
ΔCLRt -0.000961 *** 0.010  0.000328  0.123 
ΔCUMVIOLt 0.053768 *** 0.000  0.044875 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt -0.128433 *** 0.000  -0.132273 *** 0.000 
ΔRATt-12 0.112229  0.203  0.115690 ** 0.029 
ΔUSAGEt-12 0.000315 ** 0.024  0.000789 *** 0.004 
ΔAMPLIt-12 0.000054  0.590  -0.000105  0.458 
ΔCLRt-12 -0.000171  0.572  0.000394 * 0.063 
ΔCUMVIOLt-12 0.027453 ** 0.013  0.034768 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt-12 -0.015063  0.312  -0.018249  0.187 
GROUP2 -0.204008 ** 0.034  -0.377041 *** 0.000 
GROUP3 -0.373963 *** 0.000  -0.307422 *** 0.000 
Const. -3.38957 *** 0.000  -3.201405 *** 0.000 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.070    0.073   
Obs. 589,965    225,515   
 
Panel B: Estimation results by bank-customer distance (DIST) 
 Low distance  High distance 
Dep. Var.: DEFt+1 Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
ΔRATt 0.093915 *** 0.004  0.132847  0.184 
ΔUSAGEt 0.000587 *** 0.000  0.000970 * 0.095 
ΔAMPLIt -0.000033  0.595  0.000152  0.531 
ΔCLRt -0.001053 *** 0.003  0.000338  0.173 
ΔCUMVIOLt 0.049231 *** 0.000  0.069549 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt -0.128676 *** 0.000  -0.145518 *** 0.000 
ΔRATt-12 0.112676 ** 0.048  0.161618 * 0.055 
ΔUSAGEt-12 0.000455 ** 0.021  0.000590 *** 0.000 
ΔAMPLIt-12 -0.000082  0.490  0.000411  0.187 
ΔCLRt-12 -0.000036  0.911  0.000005  0.968 
ΔCUMVIOL t-12 0.032019 *** 0.000  0.022233  0.203 
ΔLIMITt-12 -0.016696  0.149  -0.007458  0.629 
GROUP2 -0.348341 *** 0.000  -0.060286  0.731 
GROUP3 -0.372709 *** 0.000  -0.367384 ** 0.025 
Const. -3.285310 *** 0.000  -3.403266 *** 0.000 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.078    0.088   
Obs. 722,365    93,115   
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Table V 
Probit regression results for accounts with and without credit lines 
The dependent variable is default at calendar time t+1 (DEFt+1 takes the value 1 for jumps to default and 0 for 
non-defaults). Explanatory variables are the rating change (ΔRAT), the change of the absolute checking account 
amplitude (ΔAMPLI), and the change of the cumulative number of overdrafts (ΔCUMOVER) during the period 
[t, t-12]. Regressions take into account the clustering of observations at the account level and are based on p-
values from Huber-White robust standard errors. 
 
 Accounts with and 
without credit lines 
 Account without credit 
lines only 
Dep. Var.: DEFt+1 Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
ΔRATt 0.082125 *** 0.000  0.017954  0.552 
ΔAMPLIt -0.000013  0.912  0.000038  0.658 
ΔCUMOVERt 0.084736 *** 0.000  0.095947 *** 0.000 
Const. -3.546377 *** 0.000  -3.442699 *** 0.000 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.086    0.107   
Obs. 2,208,675    927,448   
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Table VI 
Probit regression results by structure of the bank-customer relationship 
The dependent variable is default at calendar time t+1 (DEFt+1 takes the value 1 for jumps to default and 0 for 
non-defaults). Explanatory variables are the rating change (ΔRAT), the change of the credit line usage 
(ΔUSAGE), the change of the absolute checking account amplitude (ΔAMPLI), the change of the credit-to-limit 
ratio (ΔCLR), the change of the cumulative number of limit violations (ΔCUMVIOL) and the relative change of 
the credit limit (ΔLIMIT) during the period [t, t-12]. We divide the variables ΔUSAGE and ΔCLR by 100 to 
scale the estimated coefficients. Regressions take into account the clustering of observations at the account level 
and are based on p-values from Huber-White robust standard errors. 
 
Panel A: Estimation results for single and multiple-account bank relationships 
 Single account 
bank relationships 
 Multiple account 
bank relationships 
Dep. Var.: DEFt+1 Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
ΔRATt 0.050171  0.269  0.224470 *** 0.000 
ΔUSAGEt 0.000284 *** 0.008  0.000137 * 0.100 
ΔAMPLIt -0.000238 *** 0.008  -0.000069  0.259 
ΔCLRt -0.000091 *** 0.003  -0.000341 * 0.060 
ΔCUMVIOLt 0.077009 *** 0.000  0.073649 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt -0.086478 *** 0.000  -0.079814 *** 0.000 
Const. -3.64889 *** 0.000  -3.645819 *** 0.000 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.067    0.063   
Obs. 772,873    508,354   
 
Panel B: Estimation results by proxies for the most important account per customer 
 Most important account 
(highest mean credit) 
 Most important account 
(longest time series) 
Dep. Var.: DEFt+1 Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
ΔRATt 0.095906 *** 0.006  0.112403 *** 0.002 
ΔUSAGEt 0.000283 *** 0.010  0.000146 * 0.067 
ΔAMPLIt -0.000134 *** 0.001  -0.000147 *** 0.000 
ΔCLRt -0.000109 *** 0.001  -0.000108 *** 0.001 
ΔCUMVIOLt 0.078918 *** 0.000  0.077557 *** 0.000 
ΔLIMITt -0.088597 *** 0.000  -0.086922 *** 0.000 
Const. -3.67367 *** 0.000  -3.664562 *** 0.000 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.072    0.070   
Obs. 1,142,540    1,142,717   
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Figure 1 
Credit line usage and limit violations 
Credit line usage (in %) is measured as USAGE_LOW = LOW / LIMIT and USAGE = MID / LIMIT. 
USAGE_LOW for defaulters (all customers) is displayed by a solid (broken) gray line. USAGE for defaulters 
(all customers) is displayed by a solid (broken) black line. The cumulative number of credit limit violations 
CUMVIOL is calculated for each individual checking account in calendar time (solid line for defaulters, broken 
line for all customers). A violation occurs if the monthly minimum account balance falls short of the credit line, 
i.e. LOW < LIMIT. The event study is based on 1,009 defaults during the period January 2002 to December 
2006. Event time is measured in months and defaults occur at event time 0. 
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Figure 1b: Cumulative number of limit violations 
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Figure 2 
Absolute checking account amplitude 
The absolute checking account amplitude (in thousands of EUR) is defined as AMPLI = HIGH - LOW. The solid 
(broken) black line displays AMPLI for defaulters (all customers). The event study is based on 1,009 defaults 
during the period January 2002 to December 2006. Event time is measured in months and defaults occur at event 
time 0. 
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Figure 3 
Monthly cumulative credit and debit payments relative to the credit line 
The credit-to-limit ratio (in %) is defined as CLR = CREDIT / LIMIT x (-1). CLR for defaulters (all customers) 
is displayed by a solid (broken) black line. DLR for defaulters (all customers) is displayed by a solid (broken) 
gray line. The debit-to-limit ratio (in %) is defined as DLR= DEBIT / LIMIT x (-1). Both CLR and DLR can 
take positive values only since we multiply the credit line LIMIT by (-1) and DEBIT and CREDIT are defined as 
positive numbers. The event study is based on 1,009 defaults during the period January 2002 to December 2006. 
Event time is measured in months and defaults occur at event time 0. 
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Figure 4 
Absolute checking account amplitude by group and size 
The absolute checking account amplitude (in thousands of EUR) is defined as AMPLI = HIGH – LOW. AMPLI 
for defaulters (all customers) is displayed by a solid (broken) black line. This figure reports AMPLI by GROUP 
based on the customer’s legal form (companies, small businesses, and individuals) and SIZE based on the 
average credit payments in a month (<75%: small, 75%-95%: mid, >95%: large). The event study is based on 
1,009 defaults during the period January 2002 to December 2006. Event time is measured in months and defaults 
occur at event time 0. 
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       Figure 4b: Small businesses          Figure 4e: Mid-sized customers 
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          Figure 4c: Individuals            Figure 4f: Small customers 
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Figure 5 
Credit line usage by default type  
Credit line usage (in %) is measured as USAGE = MID / LIMIT. USAGE for customers downgraded to rating 6 
(rating 5) is displayed by a solid black (gray) line while USAGE for all firms is displayed by a broken black line. 
The event study is based on 541 defaults (downgrades to rating 5, “rat5”) and 468 defaults (downgrades to rating 
6, “rat6”) during the period January 2002 to December 2006. Event time is measured in months and defaults 
occur at event time 0. 
 
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-36 -30 -24 -18 -12 -6 0 6 12
Event time (months)
%
USAGE(Defaulters, Rating 5) USAGE(Defaulters, Rating 6) USAGE(All)
 
 43
Figure 6 
Credit line usage and absolute checking account amplitude by ratings 
Credit line usage (in %) is measured as USAGE = MID / LIMIT. The absolute checking account amplitude (in 
thousands of EUR) is defined as AMPLI = HIGH – LOW. This figure conditions the checking account variables 
on the start rating (in the first month of a customer’s checking account time series) and the pre-default rating (in 
the month prior to default). We distinguish between the ratings from 1-3 and rating 4. The event study is based 
on 1,009 defaults during the period January 2002 to December 2006. Event time is measured in months and 
defaults occur at event time 0. 
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 Figure 6c: USAGE by pre-default rating  Figure 6d: AMPLI by pre-default rating 
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